The erosion of transatlantic trust, spurred by the policies of former U.S. President Donald Trump, is prompting a controversial internal debate within Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) regarding the nation’s nuclear security posture. Proposals are surfacing that suggest a potential German financial contribution towards the development of a European nuclear deterrent, a move that would represent a significant shift in Berlin’s long-held defense strategy.
CDU foreign policy expert Roderich Kiesewetter, in comments to “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, indicated that while Germany wouldn’t assume leadership of such a program, a financial stake remains a feasible option. He estimates a development timeline ranging from five to ten years, highlighting the complexity of such an undertaking. This consideration is fueled by growing regional instability, including heightened tensions with Russia, which are also prompting similar discussions in nations like Finland, Sweden and Poland – potential allies in any future defense framework.
The fragility of relying solely on France for nuclear security is also a factor, particularly given the possibility of a Marine Le Pen presidency, a scenario that would cast significant doubt on the robustness of French deterrence policy. Kiesewetter pointed to the existing 2+4 Treaty, which formally prohibits Germany from developing its own nuclear weapons, but carefully suggests that a financial contribution and collaboration with other nations does not constitute a direct violation. He argued Germany could “finance” such weapons, allowing them to be stationed elsewhere, without independently manufacturing or deploying them. This approach, he stated, represents necessary “contingency planning” for a nation committed to its defense, requiring the exploration of even improbable, yet dangerous, scenarios.
Currently, US nuclear weapons are stored at the Büchel Air Base in Rhineland-Palatinate and German soldiers are integral to their potential deployment under the existing nuclear sharing agreement. The debate has intensified due to concerns sparked by a hypothetical U.S. attack on Greenland. Such an event could trigger a collapse of NATO and potentially jeopardize the current US nuclear umbrella – a scenario that requires reassessment. Kiesewetter acknowledged the sensitive nature of the discussion, describing it as requiring “a delicate touch” especially in light of the potential ramifications for the transatlantic alliance and Germany’s relationship with the United States. A functional system would necessitate clarifying crucial details concerning command authority, decision-making processes, deployment locations and testing protocols.
However, the proposals have drawn strong criticism, particularly from within the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Rolf Mützenich, SPD’s foreign policy spokesperson, vehemently condemned the idea, warning that even indirect involvement, whether through financial contributions or weapon storage, would be incompatible with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 2+4 Treaty. He cautioned against encouraging a global trend towards further nuclear proliferation in reaction to perceived unreliability from the United States, emphasizing the urgent need to strengthen arms control through negotiation and diplomacy, even as existing international frameworks appear to be dissolving. Mützenich stressed the importance of including China in any future arms control discussions, warning that a world with more nuclear powers would inevitably be more dangerous.
